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Forthcoming ine Philosophical Review
Names are Variables
Anders J. Schoubye†
Abstract
millianism and descriptivism are without question the two most prominent views with
respect to the semantics of proper names. However, debates between millians and descrip-
tivists have tended to focus on a fairly narrow set of linguistic data and an equally narrow
set of problems, mainly how to solve with Frege’s puzzle and how to guarantee rigidity. In
this paper, I focus on a set of data that has been given less attention in these debates—namely
so-called predicative uses, bound uses, and shied uses of names. I rst show that these data
points seem to favor a descriptivist view over a millian view, but I then introduce an
alternative view of names that not only provides a simple and elegant way of dealing with
the data, but also retains rigidity without becoming subject to the problems raised by Frege’s
puzzle.is is the view that names are variables, also called variabilism.
Introduction: A Familiar Debate
Millianism
e orthodox view in philosophy of language with respect to proper names is mil-
lianism.is is the view that the meaning of a name is exhausted by its reference
and consequently that a name contributes only its reference to the truth conditions
of a sentence. In a standard intensional semantics, the lexical entry for a name would
†Versions of this paper were presented at PhLiP, the University of Copenhagen, and the memorial
session in honor of Delia Fara at the Pacic APA. I would like to thank the audiences at these venues
for their comments and questions. I also would like to thank Brian Rabern for numerous fruitful
discussions that helped improve the paper signicantly. Finally, this paper is dedicated to the memory
of Delia Fara who I considered both a mentor and a friend.
therefore be the following.1
JDel NajaKc,g,i = Del Naja
is simple analysis of names, owing to Mill (1843) but popularized by Kripke
(1980), has a wide array of signicant upshots, but one in particular is generally
agreed to be especially important, namely that names are rigid designators. Rigid
designation is dened as follows.
rigid designation
A term τ is a rigid designator i for all worlds w and w′: JτKc,g,w = JτKc,g,w′
In other words, an expression τ is rigid i its reference is constant across possible
worlds and it is easy to see that names satisfy this constraint given a millian analysis.
e extension of a name is insensitive to parameters of the index, so shiing parame-
ters of the index will never result in shiing the extension of the name. Hence, the
extension of any name remains constant across all possible worlds.
is upshot of the Millian view is signicant, because it concurs with predominant
judgments about the meaning of names in certain modal and counterfactual environ-
ments. For example, if the modal ‘might’ in (1) is used to make a claim about what is
metaphysically possible (i.e. as an existential quantier over metaphysically possible
worlds), it is widely agreed that the sentence is false.
(1) Del Naja might not have been Del Naja.
If names are rigid, the truth of (1) would require the existence of a metaphysically
possible world where the law of identity fails. Since, presumably, such a world is
impossible, the Millian analysis correctly predicts that (1) is false—indeed necessarily
false.
e Millian analysis is, however, not without problems, the most famous being
Frege’s Puzzle.is is the observation that co-extensional names may dier in what
Frege referred to as cognitive value (1892, 151). To illustrate, suppose that the names
1I follow standard practice of using double brackets, J⋅K, as a function from expressions to semantic
values, c as a context of utterance, g as a variable assignment (a function from natural numbers to
individuals in the domain), and i as an index. In this paper, I will make the simplifying assumption that
the index consists of only a possible world and therefore suppress i in favor of a simple world-parameter.
Hence, JDel NajaKc,g,i is a function from an expression, a context c, an assignment g, and a possible
world w to the semantic value (the extension) of that expression at c, g, and w.
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‘Del Naja’ and ‘Banksy’ are co-extensional. Given this, the millian analysis predicts
that (2) and (3) have identical meanings.2
(2) Del Naja is Del Naja.
(3) Del Naja is Banksy.
e sentence in (2) is intuitively uninformative and knowable a priori; coming
to know that the famous rapper and producer from Massive Attack, Robert Del
Naja, is self-identical seems trivial as this follows straightforwardly from the law of
identity. By contrast, the sentence in (3) is informative and knowable only a posteriori;
coming to know that Del Naja is identical to the infamous street artist and political
activist, Banksy, seems highly informative, especially as Banksy’s identity is generally
unknown. Moreover, acquiring this information seems to require something beyond
purely non-empirical reasoning. Accordingly, it would be natural to conclude that
(2) and (3) must dier in meaning.
In an eort to resist this conclusion, one could argue that this alleged dierence in
cognitive value is irrelevant with respect to semantic analysis. Aer all, if ‘Del Naja’
and ‘Banksy’ really are co-referential, one might think that these sentences must have
identical truth conditions. And since semantics plausibly deals in truth conditions
and not cognitive values (whatever those are), one might argue that a dierence in
cognitive value need not be captured by the semantic analysis.
However, as is well known, there are cases where the substitution of co-extensional
names do intuitively aect the truth conditions, for example when names occur
within the scope of propositional attitude verbs. Consider (4) and (5).
(4) Goldie believes that Del Naja is Del Naja.
(5) Goldie believes that Del Naja is Banksy.
It is relatively easy to imagine a context where (4) is intuitively true, but (5) is
intuitively false. Given this, it seems natural to conclude that the truth conditions of
2I should provide some background to this example: Robert Del Naja (also known as ‘3D’) is a
British musician and member of the Bristol-based trioMassive Attack. Banksy is a street artist who is
famous mainly for his political art, namely murals and installations that have appeared in major cities
across Europe and the United States. Banksy’s identity is generally unknown, but some people believe
that Del Naja is Banksy. One reason is that Banksy’s early work grew out of the underground grati
scene in Bristol which is also where Del Naja started his career. Moreover, some people have noticed
that Banksy’s murals have consistently appeared in places where Massive Attack were concurrently
on tour, cf. https://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/music/news/banksy-robert-del-naja-
massive-attack-art-who-is-he-identity-real-name-grati-music-similarities-a7805741.html. I have no
rm opinion on the plausibility of this theory, but simply note that this is makes for an excellent
illustration of Frege’s puzzle.
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these sentences must dier. However, if it is assumed that the meaning of a name is
exhausted by its reference, then the content of (4) is ipso facto semantically identical
to the content of (5), and so it is not clear that such a dierence in truth conditions
can be captured.3 Consequently, it seems that Frege’s puzzle is a prima facie problem
for millianism aer all.
Much more could be said about the virtues and vices of millianism, but for now
let’s turn to the main opposing view.
Descriptivism
In philosophy of language, the term descriptivism refers to a family of broadly
related views. What these views have in common is that names are analyzed as
having some kind of fundamentally descriptive meaning. For the purposes of this
paper, I will focus on one subclass of these views, namely so-called metalinguistic
descriptivism. Generally speaking, this is the view that the truth conditional contri-
bution of a name is some kind of descriptive element involving a naming constraint.4
For example, the meaning of the name in ‘Del Naja’ (6) is sometimes argued to be
equivalent to a denite description whose restrictor expresses one of the naming
constraints in (6a)–(6d).5
(6) Del Naja is a musician.
a. e person called Del Naja is a musician. (Kneale, 1960)
b. e thing which is the bearer of ‘Del Naja’ is a musician. (Katz, 2001)
c. e /dєl Naja/ is a musician. (Matushansky, 2006)
d. e Del Naja is a musician. (Fara, 2015)
When names are analyzed as contributing some kind of descriptive content, this
raises an immediate question about the extent to which this is reected in the syntax.
ere are several positions that one may take with respect to this question. One
option is what I will refer to simply as semantic descriptivism. is is the view
3Some people deny that there is a truth conditional dierence between (4) and (5), e.g. Salmon
(1986), but I assume that the claim that there is an intuitive dierence in truth conditions, i.e. that one
can conceive of a possible state of aairs in which (4) is true while (5) is false, is generally accepted.
4is means that I am ignoring one particular brand of descriptivism championed by Frege
(1892) and Russell (1905), sometimes referred to as famous deeds descriptivism, and various cluster-type
variants of these views, e.g. Searle (1958).is is partly because I consider metalinguistic views more
plausible, but also for simplicity.e problems raised in this paper for metalinguistic descriptivism
apply equally to these views.
5I remain agnostic as regards the plausibility of these suggestions since it is irrelevant for the purposes
of this paper.is is simply to emphasize that even within the subclass of metalinguistic views, there
is still disagreement regarding the formulation of the naming constraint.
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that names are syntactically simple but have the semantics of a Fregean denite
description.e lexical entry for the name ‘Del Naja’ would therefore look something
like (7).6
(7) JDel NajaKc,g,w ={ (ιx.Del Naja(x) in w) if ∣{x: Del Naja(x)}∣ = 1 in wundened if ∣{x: Del Naja(x)}∣ ≠ 1 in w
On this view, there is a signicant syntactic dierence between names and denite
descriptions; the logical form (LF) of the sentence in (8) is (8a) while the LF of the
sentence in (9) is (9a). However, given the semantic descriptivist analysis of
names, the meaning of (8) and (9), i.e. the truth conditional content of (8) and (9), is
equivalent.
(8) Del Naja is a musician.
a. [s [np Del Naja] [vp is a musician]]
(9) e person called Del Naja is a musician.
a. [s [dp [d the] [np person called Del Naja]] [vp is a musician]]
Another option is what I refer to as syntactic descriptivism.is is the view that
names only appear syntactically simple, but are in fact full-edged denite descrip-
tions at LF. So, for example, while the surface form of (8) might intuitively suggests a
syntactic structure similar to (8a), it actually has a more complex syntactic structure,
namely that given by (9a). In other words, according to syntactic descriptivism,
names are syntactically complex. Note that this is a view solely about the syntax
of names, so it is neutral with respect to the semantics of denite descriptions. In
particular, syntactic descriptivism is compatible with both a referential analysis
and a (Russellian) quanticational analysis of denite descriptions.
Finally, there is predicativist descriptivism or simply predicativism.is is
the view that names are predicates (or count nouns to be precise) with a corresponding
predicative meaning, for example (10).
(10) JDel NajaKc,g,w = [λx. x is called Del Naja in w]7
6In this lexical entry ‘(ιx.Del Naja(x) in w)’ is used as a name in the metalanguage for the unique
individual called Del Naja in w.
7Just as there is disagreement among proponents of metalinguistic descriptivism in general
about the nature of the naming constraint, there is also disagreement internally among proponents of
predicativism about how to explicate the meaning of the predicate. For example, some proponents of
predicativismmaintain that names should be individuated by phonology rather than orthography
and that this has to be reected in the semantics, cf. Matushansky (2006, 2008). Worries about vicious
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is view may seem to face an immediate and obvious problem, namely that any
bare occurrence of a count noun in argument position of a predicate is ungrammatical,
cf. (11) and (12).
(11) *Tiger is a musician.
(12) *Carrot is a musician.
So, if names are count nouns, sentences such as (8) should be ungrammatical.
However, the key predicativist assumption is that if a name occurs in argument
position of a predicate, as in e.g. (8), its immediate syntactic sister is a phonologically
null denite determiner.e LF of (8) is therefore the same as that given by (9a) except
that the denite determiner is unpronounced (indicated below using strikethrough),
cf. (13) and (13a).
(13) Del Naja is a musician.
a. [s [dp [d the] [np person called Del Naja]] [vp is a musician]]
is phonologically null determiner composes with the name (i.e. the predicate)
to form a denite description, the content of which is then contributed to the truth
conditions of the sentence. In other words, like syntactic descriptivism, predica-
tivism is committed to some non-trivial theoretical assumptions about the syntax of
sentences containing names. However, it is important to notice that predicativism
is not committed to the assumption that names are syntactically complex. Names
are mere count nouns according to this view. is may seem a fairly innocuous
dierence between predicativism and syntactic descriptivism, but this is in fact
an advantage for predicativism. I discuss this issue in more detail later.8
One of the main virtues of descriptivist views in general, and indeed one of the
features that originally motivated these views, is that the problem raised by Frege’s
Puzzle never arises.is is easily demonstrated. If the meanings of the names in (2)
and (3) are equivalent to two denite descriptions, say ‘the person called Del Naja’
and ‘the person called Banksy’, it is obvious why (2) is uninformative and knowable a
priori whereas (3) is informative and only knowable a posteriori. Relatedly, it is also
circularity have also been raised to this particular aspect of the view, cf. Gray (2012, 2014, 2017). As
before, these issues are largely orthogonal to my main points, so I will ignore the issue here and simply
assume the simple ‘x is called N’ formulation. For those worried that this formulation involves a
use-mention confusion, see Fara (2011).
8As regards the syntax of names, the locus classicus for syntactic descriptivism is Russell (1905).
For extensive arguments in favor of the syntactic assumptions underlying predicativism, see Fara
(2015).
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easy to explain why someone might not believe that Del Naja is identical to Banksy
despite believing that Del Naja is self-identical. For example, one might simply not
be aware that the unique individual instantiating the property of being called Del
Naja is identical to the unique individual instantiating the property of being called
Banksy.
e technical explanation of these predictions is that co-extensional denite de-
scriptions need not be co-intensional. What a denite description denotes depends
on the extension of its descriptive predicate at the world of evaluation and given
that extensions of predicates may vary across possible worlds, a description may
therefore denote one individual at one world and denote a dierent individual at
another world.
In conclusion, if names are analyzed as descriptions, the reference of a name may
change across metaphysically possible worlds and this straightforwardly explains
why (5) can be false while (4) is true and, plausibly, why (2) and (3) are judged to
dier in cognitive value.
However, adopting a descriptivist analysis necessitates giving up rigidity since
rigid designation entails that co-extensional names are also co-intensional. And
as Kripke (1980) famously observed, this is a problem for descriptivism, because
not only is (1) incorrectly predicted to have a true interpretation, it is also predicted
to be synonymous with (14).
(14) Del Naja might not have been the person called Del Naja.
Yet, standard judgments indicate that (1) and (14) are not synonymous as (1) is
intuitively false, while (14) seems clearly true. Hence, while descriptivism avoids
the problem raised by Frege’s puzzle, this comes at a price, namely relinquishing the
rigidity of names.
A New Pathway for Settling the Debate about Names
e reason I am here rehashing these already familiar and widely debated issues is to
highlight a simple point, namely that the most debated strengths/weaknesses of the
most prominent semantic theories of names are direct inverses. While millianism
struggles with the problem raised by Frege’s Puzzle, this is a consequence of the
prediction that names are rigid designators. By contrast, while descriptivism avoids
the problem raised by Frege’s Puzzle, it does so at the cost of predicting that names
are non-rigid.
Historically, the philosophical literature on the semantics of names has focused
heavily on how these two theories might resolve their respective problems. Yet, given
the interdependent nature of these problems, one might think that alternative data
points should considered in order to settle the debate.e aim of this paper is, rst,
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to draw attention to a range of somewhat neglected data points that once analyzed
suggest that descriptivism is empirically superior to millianism, and, second, to
argue that there is an underexplored alternative to millianism that handles the
additional data points with relative ease yet retains the prediction that names are
rigid without being subject to the problems raised by Frege’s puzzle!is is the view
oen referred to as variabilismwhichmost recently has been defended by Cumming
(2008) and Schoubye (2017). If this is correct, this view would be empirically superior
to both millianism and various versions of descriptivism and hence should be
considered a serious contender in this debate.
In the next section, I detail a variety of uses of names that have received limited
attention in the literature on the semantics of names.e purpose is to evaluate the
extent to which the standard theories, i.e. millianism and descriptivism, can deal
with this data.
Neglected Data Points
Predicative Uses of Names
A predicative use of a name is a use where it seems to function syntactically and
semantically as a predicate as for example in (15)–(20).9
(15) At least three Ottos attended the meeting.
(16) ere is more than one Aksel at the meeting.
(17) Many Sarahs attended the meeting.
(18) Every Louise attended the meeting.
(19) e Michael who married a Louise attended the meeting.
(20) Most Jespers do not attend meetings.
Syntactically, the names in these sentences are composed with a quanticational
determiner (‘more than one’, ‘at least three’, ‘many’, ‘every’, ‘most’) and hence con-
stituents of determiner phrases (DPs). Semantically the names appear to express
properties, namely name-bearing properties.e most natural interpretation of, for
example, (15) is that at least three people called Otto attended the meeting.
9Sloat (1969) and Burge (1973) were, to my knowledge, the rst to seriously consider these uses, but
their discussions were mostly ignored or dismissed.is seemed to change only about ten years ago
when several proponents of predicativism, mainly Elbourne (2005), Matushansky (2006, 2008), and
Fara (2015), started emphasizing the importance of this data. When presenting this material, I nd that
these uses of names are sometimes dismissed as only marginally felicitous and/or extremely rare, but
since it is easy to nd multiple naturally occurring examples of these uses in both English and a wide
variety of other languages, I am not aware of any convincing reason to accept those claims.
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Predicative uses of names pose an immediate problem for millianism. ese
uses cannot plausibly be analyzed as referential terms as referential terms do not
normally express properties nor function syntactically as immediate constituents of
determiners phrases. In other words, predicative uses seem to directly contradict the
Millian thesis that the meaning of a name is exhausted by its reference.10
As for descriptivism, predicative uses of names might seem less problematic
as names on these views are assumed to express property-involving meanings—
properties that happen to coincide with those expressed by the predicative uses of
names in sentences such as (15)–(20). Yet, to what extent this data is friendly to
descriptivism depends in large part on the syntactic and semantic assumptions un-
derlying the particular views. For example, if one assumes that names are syntactically
simple but have the semantics of denite descriptions, i.e. semantic descriptivism,
then the cases in (15)–(20) are clearly problematic. Semantically, a denite descrip-
tion cannot compose with a quanticational determiner, so it is unclear how such a
view would compositionally predict the right truth conditions. Alternatively, if it is
assumed that names are syntactically complex, for example along the lines of syn-
tactic descriptivism, then one should predict that the sentences in (15)–(20) are
ungrammatical as in English a denite description cannot combine syntactically with
various quanticantional determiners. In short, it is not clear that predicative uses of
names are more easily captured by descriptivist views in general. However, there
is one descriptivist view that handles this data seamlessly, namely predicativism.
If names are analyzed as count nouns, the syntactic and semantic behavior of a name
should presumably parallel the behavior of every other count noun. As a result,
predicativists predict that names should be able to combine with quanticational
determiners just like all other count nouns and this is exactly what the data suggests.
So, it seems that with respect to predicative uses of names, predicativism has a
signicant advantage over both millianism, but also various other descriptivist
views.11
10Now, one frequent and fairly natural response to this prima facie problem is to argue that names
are simply systematically ambiguous between referential and predicative types and that millianism is
only intended to provide an analysis of the former. However, such an ambiguity view is problematic for
a variety of reasons. I will discuss these reasons in detail in later sections.
11As regards the distributional data concerning names and determiners, I am ignoring one particular
complication, namely that names cannot in general occur with ‘the’, i.e. ‘e Del Naja is a musician’ is
normally judged to be anomalous. Building on observations from Sloat (1969), Fara (2015) oers an
elegant explanation of this fact that supports a general predicativist view, but see Jeshion (2017) for a
response.ese are somewhat nitty gritty details that do not substract from the general conclusion that
predicativism is signicantly better positioned to account for predicative uses of names than both
millianism and various other types of descriptivist views.
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Bound Names
A bound use of name is an occurrence of a name in argument position of a predicate
where the meaning of the name intuitively co-varies with some antecedent, typically
an indenite determiner phrase. For example, consider the uses of the names in (21)
and (22) below.
(21) If a child is christened ‘Bambi’, Disney will sue Bambi’s parents. (Geurts, 1997,
321)
(22) Every woman who has a husband called John and a lover called Gerontius
takes only Gerontius to the Rare Names Convention. (Elbourne, 2005)
e names in these sentences do not intuitively refer to some specic individual.
Rather, (21) seems to express a general claim about individuals named ‘Bambi’ (and
what happens to their parents) and (22) seems to express a general claim about
individuals named ‘Gerontius’ (and what conventions they get to attend). However, if
it is assumed that the meaning of the above occurrences of ‘Bambi’ and ‘Gerontius’ is
simply their respective referents, the co-varying interpretations cannot be captured.
As a result, bound uses of names also appear to pose at least a prima facie problem
for the millian thesis that the meaning of name is exhausted by its reference.
As for descriptivism, bound uses of names are to some extent expected. It is
well known that denite descriptions have similar kinds of bound (or co-varying)
interpretations, see e.g. (23) below.
(23) In every philosophy department in the country, at least one student aced the
exam in Logic 1.
(23) has a natural interpretationwhere the description ‘the exam in Logic 1’ co-varies
with philosophy departments. In other words, this sentence has an interpretation
where it is true if the students in question aced dierent exams. So, if the meaning of
a name is equivalent to some denite description, one should expect that names too
are susceptible to these kinds of bound interpretations.
How exactly bound interpretations of denite descriptions are best syntactically
and semantically analyzed is, admittedly, a non-trivial issue and it seems likely that
the best explanation of bound uses of names will vary depending on the type of
descriptivism in question. For example, Elbourne (2005) who is a proponent of
predicativism, argues that denite descriptions contain a free individual variable
that is either bound by a higher quantier or saturated by the context.is assumption
is then used to explain how the bound interpretation of ‘the exam in Logic 1’ arises for
(23). Izumi (2013), another proponent of predicativism, adopts a situation semantics
where the description is associated with a bindable situation variable that gives rise
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to dierent denotations relative to dierent situations. However, notwithstanding the
complexities of capturing bound interpretations of denite descriptions, the main
point here is that if names are analyzed as denite descriptions and it is antecedently
acknowledged that descriptions can have bound interpretations, sentences such as
(2) and (3) do not pose a problem for descriptivist views. Whatever theory best
captures standard bound interpretations of denite descriptions will also suce to
capture bound interpretations of names.
In addition to the intra-sentential bound uses of names in (21) and (22), names
also have cross-sentential bound uses, for example (24).
(24) ere is a gentleman in Hertfordshire by the name of ‘Ernest’. Ernest is
engaged to two women. (Cumming, 2008, 526)
e proposition expressed by the second sentence of (24) is intuitively a general
existential proposition rather than a singular proposition.at is, the truth of this
sentence does not depend on a specic individual. It is intuitively true as long as some
Ernest or other is engaged to two women.
Suppose, for instance, that I deduce [24] solely from onomastic and marital
trends in the Home Counties. In that case, I have no particular Ernest in mind
when I utter [24], and my claim must be a general, existential one.
(Cumming, 2008, 536)
So, as should be obvious, cross-sententially bound uses of names are equally prob-
lematic for themillian thesis that themeaning of a name is exhausted by its reference.
And, once again, this result is to some extent anticipated by descriptivism since
denite descriptions have essentially parallel uses, i.e. uses where the meaning of
the description is intuitively anaphoric on an indenite determiner phrase in an
antecedent sentence, cf. (25).
(25) ere is a gentleman named Ernest in Hertfordshire.e gentleman named
Ernest is engaged to two women.
As in (23), the proposition expressed by the second sentence of (25) is a general
existential proposition and not an object-dependent propositionwhose truth depends
on the relational properties of some specic individual.
To conclude, it again seems that the data generally favors descriptivism over
millianism.
Shied Names
As mentioned above, the thesis that the meaning of a name is exhausted by its refer-
ence entails rigidity. Moreover, it entails that co-extensional names are co-intensional
11
and hence immune to operators whose function is to shi the parameter governing
the world of evaluation, i.e. modal operators.is is a desirable result in certain cases,
for example in (2) where the modal is used to quantify over metaphysically possible
worlds. However, we have already seen cases where rigidity arguably fails, namely (4)
and (5). In these cases, the names are embedded in the scope of propositional attitude
verbs that are standardly analyzed as modals.us, in order to predict that (4) and
(5) dier in truth value, it seems that one would have to assume that the names in (4)
and (5) are not rigid.
However, since propositional attitude verbs are arguably some of the most seman-
tically complex expressions in natural language, proponents of millianismmight be
inclined to think that cases such as (4) and (5) are problematic mainly because our
present understanding of these expressions is too primitive.12 Unfortunately, the same
issue arises with simple epistemicmodals. For example, given that Banksy’s identity is
currently unknown, an utterance of (26) is intuitively true if we have positive reasons
to believe that Del Naja is the person responsible for Banksy’s work.
(26) Del Naja might be Banksy.
If, unbeknownst to any of us, Del Naja is in fact not Bansky, the standard view
predicts that (26) is false, but this seems contrary to standard judgments in these
cases.13
As is the case for predicative uses and bound uses of names, millianism again ap-
pears to face a problem with respect to shied uses. While the semantics of epistemic
modals remains a controversial topic, the standard Kratzerian “contextualist” view,
simplifying somewhat, is that an epistemic modal claim such as (26) is true if the
prejacent, i.e. the sentence syntactically embedded under the modal, is true at some
possible world compatible with the speaker’s epistemic state.14 In other words, as
long as it is compatible with the speaker’s beliefs that Del Naja is the artist known as
‘Banksy’, the sentence is true.
e observations about shied uses of names is just more grist to the general
descriptivist mill. Remember, according to descriptivism, the names in (26)
are descriptions with distinct intensions and, so, assuming a run-of-the-mill modal
12For example, Kripke (1979) appears to hold this view.
13As a piece of anecdotal evidence, I did come across one actual occurrence of (26) online: “Wait!?
What?! Del Naja might be Banksy? Holy f!”.
https://www.reddit.com/r/Music/comments/5n3vm8/on mezzanine massive attack tried to escape/.
It seems quite clear that in this context both the speaker and the audience would take the sentence in
(26) to be clearly true.
14See, for example, Kratzer (1977), Kratzer (1981), von Fintel and Gillies (2011).
12
analysis of ‘might’, capturing the truth of (26) is straightforward. It is easy to imagine
a possible world w′ that is compatible with the speaker’s beliefs where the individual
called Del Naja in the actual world is identical to the individual called Banksy in
w′ (where this individual is assumed to have a certain set of additional properties,
namely being responsible for the work generally attributed to Banksy).
So, in conclusion, it again seems that the data favors descriptivism.
Scoreline
At this point, it would not be unreasonable to conclude that the benets of mil-
lianism are outweighed by its drawbacks. millianism struggles not only with the
problems raised by Frege’s puzzle, but also with capturing predicative uses, bound
uses, and shied uses of names. In addition, while millianism is typically hailed for
its prediction that names are rigid, the existence of shied uses of names suggests
that this prediction is not always desirable.
By contrast, descriptivism seems to be doing noticeably better with respect to
these data points and predicativism in particular appears to struggle only with
capturing the truth conditions of sentences containing names that are embedded
under non-epistemic modals. For this reason, one might be tempted to conclude that
predicativism is the empirically superior view.
e aim of this paper is not to provide a defense of millianism nor to argue in favor
of predicativism. Rather, the aim is to introduce and carefully consider themerits of
an alternative view, namely variabilism. In the remainder of this paper, I will argue
that variabilism provides simple and elegant explanations of predicative, bound, and
shied uses of names and nevertheless manages to retain the most important virtue
of millianism, namely predicting that names are rigid. Moreover, I will argue that
variabilism also has a way of avoiding the problems raised by Frege’s puzzle.
Variabilism is in many ways very similar to millianism, so proponents of mil-
lianism would not be giving up much by embracing the variabilist analysis.
roughout this paper, I will therefore tend to focus on how variabilism com-
pares to millianism in an eort to explain why this dierent but closely related view
has so much more explanatory potential. I will devote less time to a discussion of
the problems with predicativism.e reason for this is partly that I have already
discussed these problems in detail in Schoubye (2018), but I am also hoping that by
the end of this paper it will be clear that variabilism provides a signicantly better
account of the data than predicativism..
Variabilism
On my preferred version of variabilism, the analysis of names is analogous to the
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standard analysis of pronouns. Specically, names are assumed to be assignment
dependent singular terms with a presuppositional constraint where this constraint is
semantically equivalent to a pronominal ϕ-feature.15 So, the semantics of the name
‘Del Naja’ is the following:16
(27) JDel NajaiKc,g,w ={ g(i) if g(i) is called Del Naja in wcundened otherwise
In other words, the semantic value of a nameN is a partial function that takes a vari-
able assignment as input and returns an individual as output, namely the individual
that is determined by the assignment and the name’s numerical index.is function
is partial, because it is only dened for an argument g if the individual determined
by g has the property of being called N .e partiality of the function represents a
semantic presupposition that the intended referent of the name is called that name
and if this presupposition is not satised, the function will then be undened for that
particular argument and yield no output. In short, if a name N is used to refer to an
individual who is not called N , the presupposition associated with the name will be
unsatised and hence the name will fail to semantically refer.
I should emphasize that variabilism is proposed as an analysis of referential uses
of names only, i.e. occurrences of names in argument position of a predicate. In other
words, it is not intended to provide an immediate explanation of predicative uses of
names.e general idea, however, is that a variabilist analysis of referential uses of
names provides a simple and elegant explanation of (a) the relation between refer-
ential and predicative uses and (b) why predicative uses are systematically available
and widely cross-linguistically attested.
e similarities between a variabilist analysis of names and the standard analysis
of pronouns should be fairly obvious. Pronouns are also normally analyzed as vari-
ables, i.e. assignment dependent singular terms with presuppositional constraints.
For example, a standard semantics for the pronoun ‘she’ looks something like (28).17
15is particular version of variabilism was rst introduced and defended in Schoubye (2017). For
earlier versions of variabilism, see e.g. Yagisawa (1984), Recanati (1993), Haas-Spohn (1995), Dever
(1998), and Cumming (2008). See also Heim (1998) and Lasersohn (2016).
16A less perspicuous lexical entry, but one that better captures that the meaning of a name relative to
a variable assignment is a partial function could look like this::JDel NajaiKc,g,w = [λg′: g′(i) is called Del Naja in w c . g′(i)](g)
= g(i) (if dened)
17cf. Heim and Kratzer (1998, 242-245).
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(28) JsheiKc,g,w =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
g(i) if g(i) is female in wc
g(i) is a singular individual in wc
g(i) is not the speaker or the addressee in wc
undened otherwise
So, a pronoun triggers the presupposition that its referent satises its associated
ϕ-features (i.e. person, number, and gender features). As a result, if the pronoun ‘she’
is used to refer to an individual who is not female (or perhaps does not identify as
female), the pronoun fails to refer.
ere is wide range of signicant similarities between names and pronouns and
I discuss several of these in subsequent sections. For now, however, it is important
to emphasize that given my proposed analysis, names are predicted to be rigid
designators. Since the semantic value of a name relative to an assignment is simply
an individual, modal operators cannot shi its extension. Consequently, it is never
going to be the case that the extension of name can shi simply as a result of shiing
the world of evaluation. e same, of course, holds for pronouns. In short, with
respect to rigidity, variabilism is aligned with millianism. Given this, it might be
dicult to understand how variabilism could possibly be a signicant improvement
over millianism, but the crucial dierences between these views lie in the details.
e following sections are dedicated to spelling these out.
A Variabilist Account of the Data
Variabilism and Predicative Uses of Names
e only immediate way for the millian analysis to deal with predicative uses of
names is to assume that names are type-ambiguous and, moreover, to maintain that
the millian thesis is restricted to referential uses of names. However, one reason
that predicative uses of names are still problematic for millianism is that there is
no semantic link between predicative uses and referential uses.18 On the millian
analysis, the truth conditional contribution of a name used referentially is nothing
but the individual that the name refers to. Indeed, this is supposed to be a virtue of
millianism, because if information about the name of the referent was part of its
truth conditional content, this would give rise to various problems in modal contexts,
e.g. counterfactual contexts where the referent has a dierent name. Despite this, it
seems that some semantic information about the name of the referent is needed in
order to explain certain phenomena, for example inferences such as (29) and (30).
18e arguments in this section are abbreviated versions of arguments given by Schoubye (2017).
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(29) Otto is a linguist. So, at least one Otto is a linguist.
(30) No Aksel is a linguist. So, Aksel is not in a linguist.
ese inferences are indexically valid. at is, the truth of the premise in some
context c intuitively necessitates the truth of the conclusion in c. However, given a
millian analysis of referential names, it is not clear how to account for these infer-
ences. For example, in (29), the premise contains no truth conditional information
about the name of the referent. For (29) to be true at a context c, all that is required
is that the referent of ‘Otto’ is a linguist. In other words, it is technically possible for
the premise to be true in c while the conclusion is false in c.19
Now, another natural response to this prima facie problem for millianism is to
argue that names are not simply type-ambiguous, but rather polysemous and that the
relation between referential and predicative uses therefore requires a metasemantic
or pragmatic explanation. Leckie (2013), for example, takes this approach and oers
a broadly pragmatic explanation of these inferences on behalf of the millian.
However, notice that there inferences that involve pronouns that seem analogous
to the inferences involving names. For example, these inferences are also indexically
valid.
(31) She is a linguist. So, at least one female individual is a linguist.
(32) No female individual is a linguist. So, she is not a linguist.
Of course, one could argue that a metasemantic or pragmatic explanation is also
needed to account for these types of inferences, but there is a simpler and more
natural explanation that is consistent with the standard analysis of pronouns, namely
that the pronoun ‘she’ triggers a presupposition that its reference is female. Hence, if
the premise in (31) is true in some context c, the conclusion straightforwardly follows
in c, because the pronoun ‘she’ only refers if its reference is female.
On the variabilist analysis of names advocated here, the exact same kind of
explanation applies. Since the name ‘Otto’ triggers a presupposition that its referent
is called Otto, then if the sentence ‘Otto is a linguist’ is true in some context c, it
immediately follows that ‘at least one individual called Otto is a linguist’ is also true
19Specically, the millian semantics fails to rule out contexts where JOttoKc,wc ∈ {x: x is a linguist
in wc}, but JOttoKc,wc ∉ {x: x is called Otto in wc}, and in fact {x: x is called Otto in wc} = ∅. In this
model, the premise is true, but the conclusion is false. As noted by a referee for this journal, it would
be quite odd for there to be a context in which the name ‘Otto’ refers to someone who is not, in that
context, called Otto. However, that is precisely the problem.e millian semantics does not provide
resources to rule this out. Moreover, even if such contexts were subsequently ruled out by appealing to
pragmatic factors, this would not change the fact that the inference is then predicted to be indexically
invalid.
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in c. Moreover, note that although this presuppositional information is semantically
encoded, it is not part of the truth conditional content. A presupposition merely
constrains the domain of individuals which may be assigned as semantic values, so
the contribution to the truth conditions is simply an individual.
is is, admittedly, not a knock down argument against millianism, but it does
suggest that there is an important semantic link between predicative uses and refer-
ential uses and that the semantics of names should account for this link. Moreover,
if it can be shown that names and pronouns are importantly similar, then it seems
much less plausible to assume that the explanations of the apparent validity of the
inferences in (29)-(30) and (31)-(32) must be fundamentally dierent.e fact that a
variabilist analysis provides a simple and elegant explanation of these inferences
and that this explanation is analogous to the explanation of the equivalent inferences
involving pronouns is a strong reason to favor the variabilist analysis over the
standard millian analysis.
As regards the similarities between names and pronouns, notice that pronouns
also have predicative uses.20 For example:
(33) a. She loves classical music.
b. Oh, is your kitten a she?
(34) a. To avoid ghts over territory, there is only one male and one female in
each park.
b. I see. Is that the she?
(35) a. I don’t like him, but she’s very cute.
b. Both the kittens are shes.
is seems to suggest that pronouns are also ambiguous between referential and
predicative uses (even if the distribution of predicative uses of pronouns is smaller
than the distribution of predicative names).
20e distribution of predicative pronouns in English is, however, somewhat limited. For example, it
seems doubtful that you can use pronouns with various English determiners, e.g.‘*Every he has horns’
or ‘*Some shes hunt’, although I get conicting responses to this question.at said, it is worth noting
that these uses are acceptable in certain other languages, e.g. Danish: ‘Alle hanner har horn’ and ‘Nogle
hunner jager’ are grammatical and felicitous. Interestingly, with respect to names, we see the opposite
pattern in Danish. Names cannot be pluralized, and hence cannot be used with the same range of
determiners as in English. For example, the Danish equivalent of ‘At least three Davids have worked on
indexicals’, viz. ‘Mindst tre David-er har arbejdet pa˚ indeksikaler’ is ungrammatical. If anything this
suggest that the distribution of predicative names and pronouns is very language dependent. One other
interesting point is that predicative uses of pronouns only seem capable of expressing the property
associated with its gender feature.e same is the case in Danish. I do not have a good explanation for
this.
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Setting aside that postulating an ambiguity between referential and predicative
names is not going to help the millian explain the validity of the inferences above, it
is important to emphasize that this kind of stipulation is problematic for other reasons.
First, predicative uses of names seem systematically available for names in English
and are widely cross-linguistically attested.is makes it very implausible that this
is a case of brute ambiguity. Second, it seems that competence with referential uses
generally suces for competence with predicative uses. For example, if a speaker is
competent with referential uses of the name ‘Otto’, typically the speaker will then also
be perfectly capable of understanding or inferring the meaning of a predicative use of
this expression even if it is novel. Yet, if names are simply ambiguous, then it would
be unclear why competence with one use would generally suce for competence
with the other. Aer all, being competent with one of the meanings of ‘bank’ is not
generally sucient for a speaker to be competent with its alternative meanings.
is means that if one stipulates that names are type-ambiguous between referential
uses and predicative uses, one then needs an explanation of both the systematicity
and cross-linguistic consistency of this apparent ambiguity as well as an explanation
of the issue of competence.
One plausible explanation, that a proponent of variabilismmight appeal to, is that
predicative uses of names (and pronouns) are the result of so-called morphological
zero-derivations. Consider the word ‘bottles’.is the plural form of the word ‘bottle’
and it is the result of adding the plural sux in English ‘-s’ to the word ‘bottle’. In
other words, ‘bottles’ is morphologically derived from the word ‘bottle’ and the plural
sux ‘-s’. A zero-derivation (also called a conversion) is a case where an expression
is morphologically derived from another expression, but where there is no actual
change in morphology. For example, the verb ‘bottle’ (as in ‘please bottle the wine’) is
morphologically derived from the noun ‘bottle’ (as in ‘this is a good bottle of wine’).
So, the expression ‘bottle’ is (at least) two-way ambiguous in English as it could either
be the noun or the verb.
ere are two strong indicators of morphological derivations. First, that com-
petence with one expression typically suces for competence with the derived ex-
pression and, second, that there is some level of systematicity involved, i.e. that the
derivational process is manifested in other structurally similar cases. For example,
it is plausible that the plural noun ‘bottles’ is derived from its singular counterpart,
because competence with the meaning of the singular generally suces for com-
petence with the plural and the derivation of a plural noun using the sux ‘-s’ is
productive, i.e. there is a systematic pattern in English whereby nouns are pluralized
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by adding the sux ‘-s’.21 By contrast, it is implausible that one of the meanings of
‘bank’ is morphologically zero-derived from the other because (a) competence with
one meaning does not generally aord competence with the other and (b) there is
no systematic pattern of nominal ambiguity of this sort in English. More generally,
in order for a morphological zero-derivation to be plausible, there has to be some
kind of tangible relation in meaning between the original expression and the derived
expression and this is not the case with the meanings of ‘bank’.
Now consider the proposed variabilist analysis of names. Given this analy-
sis, there are good reasons to think that predicative uses are morphological zero-
derivations of referential uses. First, these two uses share an essential component
of meaning. For example, a referential use of the name ‘Otto’ presupposes that its
reference has a certain property, namely that its referent is called Otto.at is, the
constraint that the referent of a referential use of ‘Otto’ must satisfy is simply to have
the property of being called Otto and this is simply the meaning of ‘Otto’ when used
predicatively. It is this relation in meaning that explains why competence with the
referential use generally suces for competence with the predicative use. Second,
since predicative names are ubiquitous in English, this might suggest that there is
a general productive mechanism that allows the derivation of predicative names
from referential names. Finally, given that predicative uses of names are widely cross-
linguistically attested, one might think that this is simply more evidence that this
kind of mechanism is productive in other languages.
In conclusion, variabilism provides a simple and elegant explanation for the
existence of predicative uses of names and their relation to referential uses of names.
By contrast, this kind of explanation is not available to themilliam, because according
to this view there is no information encoded in the semantics of a name that could
ground the derivation of any relevant predicate. at is, if the Millian analysis is
correct, there is nothing about the meaning of a referential name that is in any
way similar to the meaning of its predicative counterpart. So, this means that not
21I am not suggesting that in order for a lexical item to be the product of a zero-derivation, itmust
be the case that a speaker who is competent with the original expression is automatically capable of
inferring the meaning of the derived expression.ese processes are complex, context-dependent, and
extra-linguistic factors oen seem to play a role. I am told that in parts of Glasgow, Scotland, the word
/bottle/ can be used both to describe the act of hitting someone with a bottle (‘he bottled me on the
head’) and the property of being drunk (‘he is completely bottled’). It is unlikely that a speaker who
is only competent with the noun would be able to understand these uses simply by reecting on its
meaning.at said, it would be equally implausible to assume that these uses of /bottle/ are conversions
of the noun if the meaning of the noun was completely absent in the derived expressions. Hitting
someone on the head with a bottle clearly involves an object which would normally be aptly described
using the noun ‘bottle’.
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only must the inferences above be pragmatically explained, so must the issue of
competence.
Alternative Predicative Uses of Names
ere are a variety of other predicative uses of names that one might worry that the
variabilist semantics proposed above cannot account for. One example is the use
of a name to express some kind of characteristic property. For example, the name
‘Einstein’ is oen used to mean something like ‘intellectual genius’, cf. (36) below.
(36) Frank is real Einstein.
Similarly, the name ‘Romanov’ in (37) may simply refer to a specic kind of group
membership, e.g. membership in the Romanov dynasty, rather than bearing the name
‘Romanov’.
(37) Sue is a Romanov.
And ‘Picasso’ as used in (38) may refer to a product with a certain feature relating to
Picasso, for example that it is a replica of a painting by Picasso or that it was physically
signed by Picasso, and so on.22
(38) Mary bought a Picasso.
I will refer to these predicative uses of names in general as ‘predicative non-naming
uses’, but in my discussion below, I will focus mainly on characteristic property uses.
e general points, however, apply to the other uses as well.
In my discussion of predicative uses, I considered several problems with amillian
type-ambiguity view, namely the view that names are straightforwardly ambiguous
between millian referential uses and predicative uses.ese problems were mainly
competence, language internal consistency, and indexical validities. I then argued that
with a variabilist analysis of referential uses, these problems are easily solved and
hence that a type-ambiguity view is perfectly plausible. However, the main ingredient
in this variabilist solution is the presupposition associated with referential names,
namely that the referent is called the relevant name. But, as the referee correctly notes,
it seems that such an analysis will not have a semantic relation between referential
22is far from exhausts the list of possible predicative uses of names, see e.g. Jeshion (2015) for further
examples and in-depth discussion. It is my impression that the conventionality of these expressions
vary a great deal and that some predicative uses, given the right context, can be introduced on the y.
However, as should become clear in the following, I think that only predicative naming uses of names,
i.e. uses where the name means ‘individual called N’, are particularly problematic for millianism.
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names and predicative non-naming uses of names.e putative problem, therefore,
is whether a variabilist analysis can also solve these problems for predicative non-
naming uses.is, however, assumes that predicative non-naming uses are subject
to the same problems. My claim is that they are not.
First, regarding competence, in order to understand (or somehow infer) that the
name ‘Einstein’ in (36) can mean ‘intellectual genius’, it is not sucient that one is
competent with the referential counterpart of ‘Einstein’. Aer all, one may even be
competent with using the name ‘Einstein’ to refer to Albert Einstein and not have the
slightest idea that he is world famous for his intellect. So, simply understanding the
meaning of ‘Einstein’ as used referentially is not enough to then infer that the name
is (sometimes) used to mean ‘intellectual genius’ when used predicatively. With less
conventional predicates, this gets evenmore obvious. If you overhear someone saying
‘I consider myself a Carrie more than a Samantha’, then merely being competent with
referential uses of ‘Carrie’ and ‘Samantha’ is clearly not going to suce for you to
understand (or infer) what the speaker said.23
is sharply contrasts the cases where a name N is used to mean ‘individual called
N’. In such cases it seems that mere competence with the referential use of the name
is generally sucient for grasping or inferring the predicative use. In my view, this
suggests that there is a relation in meaning between the referential use of a name
and its predicative naming counterpart. And this relation could, as the variabilist
would have it, be a relation between a presupposition associated with the referential
use and the meaning of the predicative use.
Second, regarding language internal consistency, in English every name appears to
have a predicative naming use, i.e. a use where it expresses something like ‘individual
called N ’.is alone strongly suggests that there must be a generalized mechanism
that facilitates the derivation of one from the other. Notice, also, that it is quite dicult
to imagine that a referential name N* could be introduced into English without then
subsequently permitting the derivation of a corresponding predicative naming use,
i.e. a predicative use where it would mean ‘individual called N*’.
By contrast, it is not the case that every name in English can immediately be used to
predicate a non-naming property and, comparatively, these uses are exceedingly rare.
Consequently, there is no obvious reason to think that there is an important relation
in meaning between the referential use of a name N and a predicative non-naming
use of N. Nor is there any good reason to think that there is a generalized mechanism
23Onmost occasions, you would instead need to be fairly familiar with the TV show ‘Sex in the City’.
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that allows the derivation of one from the other.24
Finally, I argued earlier that the inferences in (29) and (30) are indexically valid
and that this cannot be explained if one assumes that names are type-ambiguous
while also accepting a standard millian analysis of referential names. However, a
referee for this journal noted that a similar type of inference could be argued to hold
between referential uses and non-naming uses of names, e.g. characteristic property
uses. If this is correct, it would be a problem for both millianism and variabilism.
e referee provided an example similar to (39).
(39) ere are no Einsteins [intellectual geniuses] in attendance. Hence, Albert
Einstein is not in attendance.
However, the worry with this inference is that it is not indexically valid. To see why,
simply imagine a context where a speaker truly asserts both ‘ere are no Einsteins
[intellectual geniuses] in attendance’ and ‘Albert Einstein is in attendance’. Such a
context is clearly possible. It is a context where Albert Einstein is not an intellectual
genius.ere is nothing inherently inconsistent about such a context.
By contrast, a context where someone truly asserts both ‘ere are no Einsteins
[individuals called Einstein] in attendance’ and ‘Albert Einstein is in attendance’ does
seem inconsistent. It is not possible for there to be no individuals called Einstein in
attendance if the speaker, in that context, can truly assert ‘Albert Einstein is in atten-
dance’.is, I think, again highlights an important dierence between predicative
naming uses of names and predicative non-naming uses of names.e former, but
not the latter, has an important relation in meaning to referential uses of names that
must be captured semantically.25
Here is another way of illustrating this point.26 Consider the sentence in (40).
(40) Einstein is not an Einstein.
If the predicate in (40) is interpreted as meaning ‘individual called Einstein’, the
sentence seems somehow anomalous. In particular, it appears that a speaker cannot
24at is, it may be a case of ambiguity that is not a problem for either millianism or variabilism.
However, this is of course not to suggest that it is a complete coincidence that the name ‘Einstein’ is used
to mean ‘intellectual genius’ rather than, say, the name ‘Jones’ or ‘Smith’.is obviously has something
to do with Albert Einstein. All I am arguing here is that there are no obvious reasons to think that the
characteristic property use of ‘Einstein’ is somehow morphologically zero-derived from the referential
expression ‘Einstein’.
25is leaves the question why (39) arguably seems like a good inference? My guess is that it is
because the argument is very subtly enthymematic. It has a suppressed premise, namely that Albert
Einstein is an intellectual genius, but this premise is already common ground.
26anks to Brian Rabern, p.c.] for suggesting this way of illustrating the problem.
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assert this sentence without making some a linguistic mistake: If Einstein is not called
Einstein, then it should not be possible to refer to Einstein using that name. But if it is
possible, then the sentence is trivially false. By contrast, if the predicate is interpreted
as a characteristic property (e.g. ‘an intellectual genius’) or group membership (e.g.
‘a member of the Einstein dynasty’) or a product (e.g. ‘a replica of a painting by
Einstein’), then the sentence is perfectly acceptable.
In short, the predicative non-naming uses of names are quite dierent from the
predicative naming uses. It thus seems very plausible that non-naming uses are just
unproblematic cases of an ambiguity.
Variabilism and Bound Names
As regards bound uses of names, variabilism has an immediate and obvious ad-
vantage over millianism. If one assumes that names are pronouns, then it should
come as no surprise that names have bound uses as this is a hallmark of pronomi-
nal expressions. Specically, if names are formally analyzed as variables, then one
should expect names to be sensitive to operators whose explicit function is to shi
variable assignments (e.g. nominal quantiers). Since names do have bound uses (as
demonstrated in previous sections), any view that makes this prediction has a ceteris
paribus advantage over views that predict that bound uses should not be possible.
However, one potential problem for variabilism is the relative infrequency of
bound uses. If names are pronouns, one might expect names to have bound interpre-
tations in more or less the same cases as pronouns as long as the requisite conditions
for licensing binding are in place. In binding theory it is standardly assumed that
a pronoun and its antecedent must be co-indexed and that the antecedent must
c-command the pronoun in order to bind it. Moreover, the grammatical features of
the pronoun must match the features of its antecedent—this is typically referred to
as feature matching. Consider the example below.
(41) [Every person called Del Naja]1 thinks he1/2 is a genius.27
e sentence in (41) has two possible interpretations.e DP ‘every person called
Del Naja’ c-commands the pronoun ‘he’ and the features of the pronoun (singular,
3rd person, masculine) match the features of the DP, so when the pronoun is used
anaphorically (represented by co-indexing), this yields a bound interpretation of the
pronoun. However, if we substitute the name ‘Del Naja’ for the relevant pronoun,
27In Government and Binding theory, cf. Chomsky (1981), the standard explanation for the lack of a
bound reading in (41) is that it is a violation of Principle B, but if variabilism is correct, names should
most likely not be classied as R-expressions and would therefore not be subject to Principle B.
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we then retain both the structural relation between the name and the DP as well as
the feature matching. So, we should expect there to be a bound interpretation of the
name in (42) as well.
(42) [Every person called Del Naja]1 thinks Del Naja1?/2 is a genius.
e problem, of course, is that there does not seem to be a natural bound interpre-
tation of the name in (42).is now raises a question for the variabilist, namely
what explains this prima facie surprising result. If names are bindable variables, then
why is there no bound interpretation of a name even when its features match with a
co-indexed DP that c-commands it?
Although this may seem problematic for the variabilist, there is a compelling
psycholinguistic explanation of this apparent discrepancy. Terms such as pronouns,
demonstratives, names, and denite descriptions can all be used to refer to the same
things.ey can also all be used anaphorically. But, as noted by Gundel et al. (1993),
these expressions appear to be governed by a so-called giveness hierachy.at is, de-
pending on the cognitive status of their intended referent or their intended anaphoric
anchor, dierent expressions are generally preferred. Simplifying somewhat, Gundel
et al. (1993) observes that when the intended referent or the intended anaphoric an-
chor is activated, for example when it can be retrieved from the immediate linguistic
environment, the use of a pronoun is strongly preferred over uses of both names and
descriptions. So, even though a speaker can express the same content using (43)–(45),
for most speakers there is a clear preference for (43) over both (44) and (45).
(43) Otto1 loves his1 mother.
(44) ? Otto1 loves Otto’s1 mother.
(45) ? Otto1 loves [the mother of Otto]1.
e same pattern can be observed in cases not involving possessives.
(46) Otto1 thinks that he1 is a genius.
(47) ? Otto1 thinks that Otto1 is a genius.
(48) ?/# Otto1 thinks that [the person called Otto]1 is a genius.
Given this observation, it is hardly surprising that occurrences of bound names are
fairly rare, because whenever an expression is bound, there will always be a retrievable
antecedent, namely a binder, from the immediate linguistic context. Consider again
(42). If the speaker intended a bound interpretation of the name, i.e. an interpretation
where the second occurrence of ‘Del Naja’ is co-indexed with the antecedent DP,
then the speaker could have used a pronoun and given that pronouns are generally
preferred in cases where the intended antecedent is activated, the fact that the speaker
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did not use a pronoun will suggest that the speaker is not intending an anaphoric
interpretation. In other words, because the speaker did not use a pronoun, the
sentence is more naturally processed as expressing a non-bound (i.e. not co-indexed)
interpretation of the name and this explains why the bound interpretation of the
sentence is so dicult to access. Finally, notice that the observation here is completely
general. In cases where a bound interpretation of a name should in principle be
available, the name is almost always in competition with a pronoun that would yield
the same interpretation. As a result, using a name rather than a pronoun will almost
always result in a non-anaphoric, and hence unbound, interpretation of the name.
So, this observation explains not only the lack of a bound interpretation of the name
in (42), but also the lack of bound interpretations in a wide variety of other cases, for
example cases which might have been thought ought to be paradigmatic examples of
bound names, e.g. (49) and (50).
(49) ? One woman called Louise1 loves Louise’s1 mother.
(50) ? Every woman called Louise1 loves Louise’s1 mother.
If the explanation above is correct, i.e. if names are consistently in competition with
pronouns and pronouns are generally preferred over names with respect to bound
interpretations, this then raises a dierent question, namely why would a bound
interpretation of a name ever be licensed? Here it is important to emphasize that the
observations made by Gundel et al. (1993) concern processing preferences. While
the givenness hierarchy is a descriptive generalization, the general hypothesis that
is supposed to explain this generalization is that while descriptively impoverished
expressions require a high degree of cognitive activation, they are preferred because
they are easier to process. So, when an intended referent is highly activated, for
example by being retrievable from the immediate linguistic environment, a pronoun
is preferred over names and descriptions because they place less cognitive demands
on processing. Given this, one might think that a bound use of a name could be
licensed in cases where using a pronoun would be more demanding with respect to
processing than using a name despite the referent being activated.
One salient candidate for a case of this kind is the example due to Elbourne (2005)—
repeated below.
(22) Every woman who has a husband called John and a lover called Gerontius
takes only Gerontius to the Rare Names Convention.
In this case, if the pronoun ‘he’ had been used instead of the name ‘Gerontius’, the
pronoun would have two potential antecedents, namely ‘a husband called John’ and
‘a lover called Gerontius’. In other words, the sentence would be ambiguous between
two possible interpretations, cf. below.
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(51) Everywomanwhohas [a husband called John]1 and [a lover calledGerontius]2
takes only him1?/2?/3 to the Rare Names Convention.
Since there is no information available in the immediate linguistic environment as
regards which antecedent is intended, processing the sentence becomes dicult. By
contrast, using a name instead of a pronoun serves as a disambiguation and therefore
simplies the processing of the sentence. Consequently, the use of a name here, even
for the bound reading, is licensed. Another example from Elbourne (2005) supports
this explanation:
(52) If John insists on calling his next sonGerontius, then his wife will be annoyed
and Gerontius will get made fun of because of his name.
(Elbourne, 2005)
Again, if the second occurrence of ‘Gerontius’ is replaced by a pronoun, there is
more than one possible anaphoric resolution, and even though the speaker might
be able to disambiguate based on simple world knowledge, the complexity of the
processing of the sentence is plausibly increased. So, again, using a name is preferred.
e explanation above not only explains why bound uses of names are generally
infrequent, but it also explains why in at least some cases bound uses of names are
licensed. While it is not clear that this explanation will work for every occurrence
of a bound name, e.g. the example in (21) from Geurts, I think this suces to show
that variabilism has a signicant advantage with respect to bound uses of names
over e.g. millianism. ere may further psycholinguistic or generally pragmatic
observations that will explain why a bound reading of the name in (21) is licensed,
but I will not explore these here. Instead I will now turn to another potential problem
for the variabilist view.28
28A referee for this journal suggested the example in (R1) and reported a judgment that the reading
where ‘Jane’ is bound is as natural as the reading where ‘she’ is bound in (R2).
(R1) Every man who knows [a woman called Jane]i thinks Janei is genius.
(R2) Every man who knows [a woman called Jane]i thinks shei is genius.
However, I must confess that I disagree with this judgment. To me, (R1) is slightly awkward and
(R2) seems clearly more natural than (R1).at said, I do think the referee is correct that the sentence
in (R1) is less awkward than e.g. (42) and I grant that this cannot be immediately explained by my
proposal above about bound names serving to disambiguate. So, at present, I simply do not have a
good explanation of this observation. I am inclined to think that this just shows that the explanation I
have provided above is not exhaustive. I think I am right that many bound interpretations of names
are licensed precisely because they serve a disambiguating purpose, but likely there are other cases in
which bound interpretations of names are licensed for another reason. It remains to be seen what these
reasons might be.
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An attentive reader might have noticed that both Geurts’ and Elbourne’s cases of
bound names are donkey cases. A donkey case is a sentence where an expression,
typically a pronoun, is bound, but where the standard structural constraints that are
assumed to govern binding are violated. In short, in a standard donkey case, the
bound expression is not c-commanded by its antecedent.is could be a potential
embarrassment to the variabilist who may have thought that simply analyzing
names as variables would immediately solve the problem of bound interpretations
of names. However, since the most prominent examples (and possibly the only
examples) of bound names are donkey cases, an explanation of these cases relying on
the standard account of variable binding is not going to work.
One natural response here is to argue that the problems raised by donkey cases
show that the orthodox view of variable binding must be reconsidered. Indeed, there
are other independent reasons for drawing this conclusion since cross-sententially
bound pronouns (and names) also cannot be captured on the standard view. In other
words, there are independent reasons for thinking that some kind of dynamic binding
theory explicitly designed to handle donkey anaphora and cross-sentential binding,
e.g. Discourse Representation eory (Kamp and Reyle, 1993; Kamp et al., 2011),
File Change Semantics (Heim, 1982), or Dynamic Predicate Logic (Groenendijk and
Stokhof, 1991), is needed regardless. And once dynamic binding theory is adopted,
capturing donkey type cases involving names is not a problem.
However, it is important to emphasize that even if a dynamic theory is adopted,
it is key to capturing bound uses of names that these are analyzed as variables, i.e.
pronouns. If names are analyzed as constants, which eectively is the millian view,
then adopting a dynamic binding theory will do nothing with respect to capturing
bound uses of names.
At this stage, I suspect that proponents of descriptivismmight be keen to em-
phasize that the observation that the cases above are donkey cases appears to count
in favor of their view. Aer all, descriptivists analyze names as descriptions and
one fairly standard approach to donkey pronouns is to treat these as covert denite
descriptions.29 However, it is important to note that descriptivism faces the same
problem as variabilism when it comes to capturing the lack of bound readings
of names and occurrences of cross-sententially bound names. To my knowledge,
simply adopting a descriptivist analysis of pronouns is not going to help solve those
problems.
29See e.g. Evans (1977, 1980), Cooper (1979), Heim (1990).
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Shied Names and Shied Pronouns
In the section on shied uses of names, I argued that bare epistemic modals can give
rise to failures of rigidity and consequently that these types of cases pose a signicant
problem for millianism. Yet, I suspect that some milliansmight respond that this
criticism is misguided since it was never assumed that names are rigid in epistemic
contexts.
I would emphasize that there need be no contradiction in maintaining that
names aremodally rigid, and satisfy a substitutivity principle for modal con-
texts, while denying the substitutivity principle for belief contexts.e entire
apparatus elaborated in ‘Naming and Necessity’ of the distinction between
epistemic and metaphysical necessity, and of giving a meaning and xing a
reference, was meant to show, among other things, that a Millian substitutivity
doctrine for modal contexts can be maintained even if such a doctrine for
epistemic contexts is rejected. ‘Naming and Necessity’ never asserted a sub-
stitutivity principle for epistemic contexts. (Kripke, 1979, fn.10, my emphasis).
However, even if we grant this, it remains unclear how millianism is supposed
to handle shied uses of names, for example cases such as (26), since capturing the
truth conditions of such sentences intuitively requires the reference of a name to
shi from its actual reference. But if the meaning of the name is exhausted by its
(actual) reference, then this simply should not be possible. So, even if it is maintained
that rigid designation is a principle restricted to non-epistemic contexts, it is
not obvious that this solves the problem for millianism. at names are rigid is
a consequence of the semantic analysis of names as constants, and so if epistemic
modals are quantiers over possible worlds, it remains unclear how to make the right
predictions in such cases.
By contrast, shied uses of names in epistemic contexts is not a problem for de-
scriptivism since, as mentioned above, one of the main benets of a descriptivist
analysis is that co-extensional names need not be co-intensional.
So, what happens if names are analyzed as variables instead of constants as the
variabilist would have it? Presumably not very much, because if the reference of a
term is determined entirely by the variable assignment, it then follows that the term is
rigid, cf. rigid designation above. In other words, if names are analyzed as variables,
they remain immune to shiing by modals. So, it might seem that variabilism is in
the same boat as millianism with respect to shied uses.
However, there is an elegant and theoretically fruitful way for the variabilist to
address this problem that is not available to the millian. To see this, let’s start by
considering another important similarity between names and pronouns, namely that
names and pronouns have the same kind of modal prole. Like names, pronouns are
also unshiable by metaphysical modals. To demonstrate, consider (53).
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(53) He might not have been Del Naja.
If the demonstrative reference of ‘he’ is Del Naja, then on a metaphysical interpre-
tation of the modal, this sentence is intuitively false. is is analogous to the case
where the name ‘Del Naja’ is substituted for the pronoun.
But, like names, pronouns can be shied by epistemicmodals. For example, assume
that the speaker has reasons to believe that Del Naja is the individual responsible for
Banksy’s work and that while pointing to Del Naja the speaker asserts (54).
(54) He might be Banksy.
Given that it is consistent with the speaker’s information state that Del Naja is
the individual responsible for Banksy’s work, the speaker’s assertion of (54) seems
clearly true. Moreover, this is not limited to 3rd person pronouns. Even the 1st person
singular pronoun—one of the so-called pure indexicals, cf. Kaplan (1989)—can be
shied in this way. Just imagine that Del Naja wakes up in a hospital bed with severe
amnesia and that he is given a copy of an article detailing all the evidence that he is
Banksy. Since Del Naja is aware that he is suering from severe amnesia and thus
may have completely forgotten what he has been doing for the past couple of years, it
seems that he may truthfully assert (55).
(55) I might be Banksy.
In short, it seems that we face the same problem with pronouns that we face with
names, namely accounting for their shiy behavior in epistemic modal contexts but
non-shiy behavior in non-epistemic modal contexts. Given this similarity between
names and pronouns, it seems natural to suppose that the explanation of this behavior
must be uniform. Yet, if names and pronouns are analyzed as fundamentally dierent
expressions, i.e. as constants and variables, then it is dicult to imagine that there
could be such a uniform explanation.
e issue of shied uses of pronouns (focusing specically on indexicals) is ad-
dressed in detail by Santorio (2012). Santorio argues that in order to account for
shied uses of indexicals, we should think of epistemic modals not simply as opera-
tors whose function is to shi the world-parameter, but rather as operators whose
function is to shi both the world-parameter and the assignment-parameter.
On the standard view, informational modals are, in essence, quantiers over
possible worlds. On the view I’m advocating, they also encode in their mean-
ing an apparatus that locates real-world individuals within the set of worlds
quantied over. us on the new picture these modals manipulate a greater
amount of information.e classical picture had them quantify over a set of
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worlds connected to the actual world via an accessibility relation; on the new
picture, they quantify in addition over counterparts of actual individuals in
each of the worlds in the set. (Santorio, 2012, 15)
e general idea behind Santorio’s proposal can, I think, be summed up in the
following way: A variable assignment is a mapping from variables to individuals
that is determined by the context and it is generally assumed to be a representation
of the referential relations that obtain given a certain set of features of the context
where these features are to some extent independent of the speaker. By contrast,
epistemic modals (or informationalmodals) are expressions whose meaning depends
on a body of information, for example the presuppositions of one or more agents—
typically including the speaker. It thus seems plausible that when an expression whose
semantic value is determined by a variable assignment (which is a representation of
the operative referential relations given a certain context) is embedded in the scope
of an epistemic modal, i.e. a modal that is sensitive to a restricted and contextually
determined body of information presupposed by one or more agents, the relevant
assignments are shied to reect this body of information, i.e. to reect what the
agents in question, given their information state, construe as the relevant referential
relations. Or in other words, to reect how the agents in question are thinking of
certain objects and individuals.e function of an epistemic modal is therefore not
merely to quantify over a set of possible worlds compatible with the epistemic state of
some agent(s), but in addition to align the representation of the relevant referential
relations with the information presupposed by the agent(s) in question.is seems
quite plausible especially when considered in relation to cases where speakers are
considering possible identities. What identities are taken to be possible is clearly
relative to the information that is presupposed by the relevant agents and the way in
which the agents are thinking of the objects in question.
Santorio therefore assumes that one function of an epistemic modal is to determine
a range of epistemic counterparts:
[...] a relation of counterparthood is simply a relation of similarity (see Lewis
(1968) and (1983)): x is a counterpart of y under a certain respect just in case
x and y are suciently similar in that respect. More specically, epistemic
counterparthood is a three-place relation of similarity (x is an epistemic coun-
terpart of y for a subject S) which captures a way a subject thinks of a certain
object. y, z, . . . are epistemic counterparts of x for S just in case (a) S has
beliefs about x and (b) y, z, . . . possess all the properties that S attributes to
x. Epistemic counterparts are generally used, within possible worlds theories
of mental content, to ‘locate’ actual world individuals within belief worlds of
subjects. (Santorio, 2012, 13)
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So, in the context where Del Naja wakes up in a hospital bed with severe amnesia,
Del Naja has limited knowledge about himself. Maybe Del Naja knows that his name
is ‘Del Naja’, that he is a member of Massive Attack, etc.ese are properties that he
attributes to himself. In this context, an epistemic counterpart for Del Naja will be
any individual that also has those properties. For this reason, it is compatible with
Del Naja’s information state that there is a counterpart who has all these properties,
but in addition also has the property of being called Banksy, having constructed the
Baloon Girl painting, etc. In short, there is a counterpart of Del Naja that is Banksy.
With respect to semantics, Santorio therefore assumes that in addition to determin-
ing an assignment function g, i.e. a function from variables x1, x2, ... xn to individuals,
the context c also determines a sequence of counterpart functions F = ⟨f 1, f 2, ... f n⟩.
Formally a counterpart function is an individual concept, i.e. a function from worlds
to individuals, and for each variable x1, x2, ... xn, there is therefore a corresponding
counterpart function that maps g(x1), g(x2), ... g(xn) to its epistemic counterpart
at various other worlds. What epistemic relation is represented by the sequence
of counterpart functions depends on the context, namely the information state of
the subject and the way in which the subject is thinking of the relevant object.e
semantics for epistemic ‘might’ and ‘must’ is then stated as follows:
(56) JmightKc,g,w = λp. for some ⟨g′,w′⟩ accessible from ⟨g,w⟩, JpKc,g′,w′ = 1
(57) JmustKc,g,w = λp. for every ⟨g′,w′⟩ accessible from ⟨g,w⟩, JpKc,g′,w′ = 1
As regards accessibility, a pair ⟨g′,w′⟩ will be accessible from ⟨g,w⟩ if and only if:
i. w′ is consistent with the speaker’s information state at w.
ii. f 1(w) = g(1) ∧ f 2(w) = g(2) ∧ f 3(w) = g(3), and so on.
iii. g′ = {⟨1, f 1(w′)⟩, ⟨2, f 2(w′)⟩, ... ⟨n, f n(w′)⟩}
Given this semantics, a sentence such as (55) is predicted to be true relative to a
context c, an assignment g, and a worldw as long as there is a possible worldw′ (that
is consistent with Del Naja’s information state at w) where a counterpart of Del Naja
is such that he is the individual responsible for Banksy’s work. And, as mentioned
above, in the context of Del Naja suering from amnesia, there is a possible world
consistent with Del Naja’s information state where his counterpart is the artist Banksy.
Hence, the sentence is true.
e purpose of this somewhat cursory explication of Santorio’s proposal is not to
argue that this is clearly the best explanation of shied uses of pronouns. Indeed,
there are several alternatives to Santorio’s proposal. For example, Cumming (2008)
has defended a variabilist analysis of names on the grounds that this can solve certain
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puzzles concerning shied uses of names in belief attributions when combined with
an analysis of belief verbs where these are treated as quantiers over both possible
worlds and assignments. Cumming’s analysis does not explicitly involve counterparts,
but it does rely fundamentally on the assumption that epistemic verbs, e.g. belief verbs,
are assignment shiers. More recently, Ninan (2012, 2013) has defended a slightly
more sophisticated version of a counterpart semantics (but otherwise similar to
Santorio’s) that is intended to deal with a more general puzzle concerning epistemic
modals and various referential terms.30 In other words, the view that epistemic
modals manipulate the assignment function in addition to manipulating the world-
parameter is becoming increasingly common.31
Now, as should be obvious, if names are analyzed as variables, then an analysis
of epistemic modals where these are treated as assignment shiers will also work
for shied names.32 For example, in the context of (26), there is a possible world
consistent with the speaker’s epistemic state where a counterpart of Del Naja is the
individual responsible for the murals and installations generally attributed to Banksy,
i.e. there is a possible world where Del Naja is the artist Banksy. In other words, by
analyzing names as variables, the variabilist can not only account for both shied
uses of names and pronouns, but do this in a completely uniform way.
30For a discussion of the dierences between these views, see Rabern (2018).
31According to the widely accepted analysis of modals due to Kratzer (1977, 1981), modals are context-
sensitive quantiers over possible worlds and the role of the context is to determine a relevant domain
of quantication. For example, if the sentence ‘must ϕ’ is used to make a nomological claim, the context
determines a set of possible worlds that are consistent with the natural laws and this is the domain of
quantication for the modal. By contrast, if that sentence is used to make a claim about metaphysical
necessities, the context then determines a set of metaphysically possible worlds instead. Since modals
such as ‘must’, ‘may’, ‘might’, etc. can be used to make a multitude of dierent kinds of modal claims in
both English and a wide variety of other languages, an analysis that treats these expressions in a uniform
way seems highly preferable to a simple ambiguity view. However, by assuming that ‘must’ and ‘might’
do not function as universal and existential quantiers over possible worlds when used epistemically,
but rather as universal and existential quantiers over assignment-world pairs, this seems to suggest
that ‘must’ and ‘might’ are lexically ambiguous. However, we are not forced to accept this conclusion.
Instead, one could assume that allmodals are (context-sensitive) quantiers over assignment-world
pairs, but that when a modal is used to make a non-epistemic claim, the relevant assignments remain
constant. is amounts to assuming that when a modal is used to make a non-epistemic claim, the
relevant counterpart relation is always identity.is, I think, would make perfect sense.
32Indeed, the main motivation for Cumming’s proposed semantics of epistemic verbs (where these
are treated as assignment shiers) is to account for cases of shied names. Moreover, while the primary
focus of Santorio’s paper is shied indexicals, Santorio does point out that his semantics would work
equally well for cases involving shied names, cf. (Santorio, 2012, 27-29). I have no particular preference
with respect to Cumming’s, Santorio’s or Ninan’s proposals, and simply used Santorio’s proposal for the
purposes of illustrating the general idea.
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By contrast, a semantics for epistemic modals along the lines of Cumming, Santo-
rio, or Ninan cannot be used by the millian to account for shied uses of names
since according to millianism, names are not expressions whose semantic value is
determined by a variable assignment. Consequently, any operator whose function
is to manipulate the assignment function is by denition incapable of shiing the
reference of such an expression. Moreover, notice that while variabilism has the
resources to deal with shied uses of names, it does this without the result that names
now violate rigid designation. In the context of ametaphysicalmodal, i.e. an expres-
sion that only manipulates the world parameter, the reference of any name (and any
pronoun) will remain constant across every possible world. In short, a variabilist
analysis of names provides exactly what we need. A way of capturing why names
have shied uses in epistemic contexts, but no shied uses in non-epistemic contexts.
By comparison, millianism has no obvious and certainly no straightforward way of
capturing shied uses of names in epistemic contexts.
As for descriptivism, the problem is the prediction that names are shiable in
e.g. metaphysical contexts. However, a referee for this journal suggested that there is
a potential solution for descriptivist views that take names to denote individual
concepts (so, not predicativism butmost other descriptivist views). As the referee
put it, a descriptivist could hold that names denote individual concepts that are
rigid across metaphysical possibilities, but non-rigid across epistemic possibilities.
e immediate worry with this suggestion is that it is not clear that it makes sense
to simply hold ormaintain that individual concepts have these properties. Aer all,
individual concepts are functions, so in order to count as rigid with respect to some
modal space, it will have to behave in a very specic way. In particular, it will have
to output the same individual across every world in the relevant modal space. But
the output of an individual concept is determined by properties of the input world,
namely what individual falls under the relevant concept at the input world. So to
ensure that such a function is rigid across metaphysical possibilities, one would have
to assume that the same individual falls under the concept at every metaphysically
possible world in the domain of the function. However, there is no plausible reason to
assume this. For example, with respect to names N , dierent individuals can clearly
fall under the concept ‘the unique individual called N’ at various metaphysically
possible worlds. Consequently, it seems that in order for this idea to work, one would
have to simply stipulate a specic domain for certain individual concepts, but this is
clearly not explanatory.33
33I wonder if what the referee really had in mind here was embracing a two-dimensional semantics
along the lines of Chalmers (2011). I think this is a more promising idea, but it comes with various
non-trivial commitments. First, in a two-dimensional semantics, expressions are assumed to have two
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Variabilism and Frege’s Puzzle
Now, admittedly there may be potential problems or objections to the type of analysis
of epistemicmodals and epistemic verbs discussed above. But if we tentatively assume
that this general idea could work then, as Cumming (2008) notes, this also promises
a general solution to Frege’s puzzle—specically the problem with explaining how
sentences such as (4) and (5) can have dierent truth conditions.
(4) Goldie believes that Del Naja1 is Del Naja1.
(5) Goldie believes that Del Naja1 is Banksy2.
If epistemic modals are assignment shiers given that they are expressions whose
meaning depends on a body of information, it seems quite natural to think that epis-
temic verbs more generally, e.g. belief-verbs, are also assignment shiers. Assuming
that true belief requires that truth at every assignment-world pair compatible with
the subject’s information state, then by using the semantic resources sketched in the
previous section, it is easy to account for the truth conditional dierence between (4)
and (5).e sentence in (4) is trivially true since relative to every assignment-world
pair ⟨g′,w′⟩ compatible with Goldie’s information state: f 1(w′) = f 1(w′). By contrast,
the sentence in (5) is not trivially true, since it need not be the case that relative
to every assignment-world pair ⟨g′,w′⟩ compatible with Goldie’s information state:
f 1(w′) = f 2(w′).
As Cumming (2008) notes, the more general point is that in order to eectively
intensions, namely so-called primary and secondary intensions. Extensions are therefore relativized to
pairs of possible worlds ⟨v,w⟩, where v represents the epistemic dimension of meaning and w represents
themetaphysical dimension ofmeaning. Second, in this framework, epistemic andmetaphysical modals
are assumed to shi dierent semantic parameters. Epistemic modals shi v, i.e. the domain of primary
intensions, whereas metaphysical modals shi w, i.e. the domain of secondary intensions. Because
epistemic and metaphysical dimensions of meaning are relegated to two distinct semantic parameters,
it is fairly simple to ensure rigidity across a single dimension without rigidity across the other. For
example, with regards to names, we could state the lexical entry as follows: JNK = [λv. [λw . ιx.is-called-
N(x) in v]].e reference of this name depends on the extension of ιx.is-called-N(x) at v. Since this
parameter is shiable only by epistemic modals/verbs, the name will refer to the same individual across
every metaphysical possibility, i.e. it will be rigid across metaphysical possibilities. By contrast, it will
not be rigid across epistemic possibilities since it might refer to dierent individuals across dierent
epistemic possibilities. In some ways, this two-dimensionalist strategy and the variabilist strategy are
quite similar. On both views, epistemically shied uses are captured in terms of a semantic parameter
separate from the parameter used to capture metaphysical modality.
is is not the place for a serious discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of two-dimensional
semantics, but this view would clearly struggle with explaining a variety of the data points described
earlier in this paper, e.g. various predicative uses of names, but also the relation between names and
pronouns. Two-dimensional semantics has also been argued to have other diculties, e.g. the nesting
problem, see Soames (2005), Dever (2007), Forbes (2011). But see also Chalmers and Rabern (2014).
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solve the problems that arise with names in modal environments, we need a certain
level of variability in somemodal environments in order to capture the right truth
conditions but no variability in other modal environments. e millian analysis
provides no variability at all, so this renders it impossible to explain epistemically
shied interpretations of names. With a descriptivist analysis, we get variability in
allmodal context, but this leads to incorrect predictions with respect to metaphysical
modals. What variabilism provides is the intermediate option: A way of securing
rigidity (invariability with respect to possible worlds), but variability with respect
to assignments. Moreover, this analysis of names parallels the analysis of pronouns
in general and given the similarity in their modal proles, this seems very desirable.
Finally, the analysis of names (and pronouns) does not parallel the analysis of def-
inite descriptions which given the dissimilarity in the modal prole of names and
descriptions again also seems highly desirable.
Conclusion
e general aim of this paper was to provide a short overview of the comprehensive
explanatory potential of variabilism. I have argued that this analysis provides a
simple and elegant explanation of predicative, bound, and shied uses of names. In
addition, I have shown that variabilism, alongsidemillianism, retains the desirable
prediction that names are rigid which remains a signicant problem for descrip-
tivist theories.34 Finally, variabilism also provides a potential solution to Frege’s
puzzle along the lines proposed by Cumming (2008) which is still one of the main
problems facing millianism.
Given the nature of this paper, I have kept my discussions of the data reasonably
short. However, the issues under discussion are both nuanced and complex, so entire
papers could have been devoted each. In other words, I do not pretend that this paper
closes the book on the semantics of names and I happily concede that more needs to
be said.ere are also additional uses of names that I have not discussed in this paper,
e.g. uses of names as verbs and deferred referential uses.35 Since these uses have not
been discussed much elsewhere, I have no reason to think that variabilism is in a
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